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Boatright and Smith: HB 316 - Voting System

ELECTIONS
Elections and Primaries Generally: Amend Chapter 2 of Title 21 of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Primaries and
Elections Generally, so as to Provide for Definitions; Provide for
Uniform Election Equipment in this State; Provide for Ballot
Marking Devices and Standards and Procedures for Such Devices;
Provide for the Manner of Qualifying Presidential Elector
Candidates for Independent Candidates for the Offices of President
and Vice President of the United States; Provide for the Time for
Filing Evidence of Nomination by Political Body Candidates;
Clarify the Age for Voting; Provide for Audits of Election Results
and Procedures Therefor; Revise and Clarify Procedures for Voter
Registration and List Maintenance Activities; Authorize the
Secretary of State to Become a Member of a Nongovernmental
Entity for Purposes of Maintaining Electors Lists under Certain
Conditions; Provide for Minimum Requirements and Form of
Information on Electronic Ballot Markers; Provide for
Confidentiality of Certain Records and Documents; Extend the
Time Period Allowing for Public Comment on Precinct
Realignments; Place Time Limits on Relocation of Polling Places;
Provide for Additional Sites for a Registrar’s Office or Place of
Registration for Absentee Ballots; Provide for the Delivery of
Absentee Ballots to Certain Persons in Custody; Provide for the
Manner of Processing Absentee Ballot Applications and Absentee
Ballots; Provide a Cure for an Elector Whose Absentee Ballot Was
Rejected; Provide for the Form of Absentee Ballot Oath Envelopes;
Provide for the Time for Advance Voting and Manner and Location
of Advance Voting; Provide for Assistance in Voting; Provide for
Ease of Reading Ballots; to Provide that a Voter Identification
Card Is Valid Until an Elector Moves Out of the County in Which
It Was Issued or Is No Longer Eligible to Vote; Provide for
Notification Procedures for Status of Provisional Ballots; Provide
for the Time for Certifying Elections; Provide for Precertification
Audits; Provide for Entitlement to and Methods for Recounts;
Provide for Conforming Changes; Provide for Related Matters;
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Provide for an Effective Date; Repeal Conflicting Laws; and for
Other Purposes
CODE SECTIONS:

BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER:
GEORGIA LAWS:
SUMMARY:

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss1/6

O.C.G.A §§ 21-2-2 (amended), -2.1
(new), -4.1 (amended), -7.1 (new), -18
(amended), -19.1 (new), -32.1 (new),
50 (amended), -132.1 (new), -172
(amended), -216 (amended), -220.1
(amended), -225 (amended), -230
(amended), -231 (amended), -232
(amended), -234 (amended), -235
(amended), -262 (amended), -265
(amended), -267 (amended), -286
(amended), -293 (amended), -300
(amended), -365 (amended), -367
(amended), -369 (amended), -372
(amended), -374 (amended), -375
(amended), -377 (amended), -379.21–
.26 (new), -381 (amended), -382
(amended), -383 (amended), -384
(amended), -385 (amended), -386
(amended), -388 (amended), -409
(amended), -413 (amended), -417.1
(amended), -418 (amended), -419
(amended), -482 (amended), -493
(amended), -495 (amended), -498
(amended), -499 (amended), -566
(amended),
-579 (amended), -580
(amended), -582 (amended), -582.1
(amended), -587 (amended)
HB 316
24
2019 Ga. Laws 7
The Act authorizes and requires a new
voting system be used in all
elections, provides for auditing
procedures, provides for updates to the
voter list maintenance laws, and
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specifies additional
election processes.
April 2, 2019
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revisions

to

History
In 2016, Russia interfered with the 2016 United States (U.S.)
presidential election “in sweeping and systematic fashion,”1 sparking
emotions ranging from mild concern to outrage from American
voters.2 Subsequent investigations found that Georgia, although not
among the twenty-one targeted states, had several county election
websites visited by Russian military spies seeking to identify
vulnerabilities in Georgia’s central voting system just weeks before
the 2016 election.3 But identifying vulnerabilities in Georgia’s
central elections server, which has been maintained at Kennesaw
State University (KSU) in the Center for Election Services (CES)
since 2002, did not require foreign hackers or rogue spies seeking to
infiltrate and tamper with the election outcome.4
In August 2016, months before Russia tried to subvert Georgia’s
election websites, professional cybersecurity expert Logan Lamb
discovered the state’s database containing 6.7 million voters and
instructions and passwords for election supervisors to operate the
direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines and access the
central server.5 Lamb also uncovered software files for electronic poll
1. 1 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1 (2019), https://static.cspan.org/files/Searchable+Mueller+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D93-6RFV].
2. Miles Parks, NPR/Marist Poll: 1 in 3 Americans Thinks a Foreign Country Will Change
Midterm Votes, NPR (Sept. 17, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/17/647420970/nprmarist-poll-1-in-3-americans-think-foreign-country-will-change-midterm-votes [https://perma.cc/3LSVZRCT]; Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So
Far, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russiainterference-election-trump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/D6LV-RS5Q].
3. Indictment at ¶ 7, United States v. Netyksho, No. 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ, (D.D.C. July 13, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download [https://perma.cc/SCK5-L52N]; Ellen Nakashima, In
Georgia, a Legal Battle Over Electronic vs. Paper Voting, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2018, 10:48 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-georgia-a-legal-battle-over-electronic-vspaper-voting/2018/09/16/d655c070-b76f-11e8-94eb3bd52dfe917b_story.html?utm_term=.fb36f51dc484 [https://perma.cc/CX4Q-QDUY].
4. Curling v. Raffensperger, No. 1:17-cv-2989-AT, 2019 WL 3822123, at *21 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 15,
2019).
5. Kim Zetter, Was Georgia’s Election System Hacked in 2016?, POLITICO (July 18, 2018),
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books and executable programs that could infect the central system
with vote-changing malware, all of which were accessible on the
CES’s public website.6 It was later determined that the server had
been unsecured and exposed to the cyber world since 2014.7
Although Lamb immediately reported his unnerving discovery to the
Director of CES, one of Lamb’s colleagues, Christopher Grayson,
was able to locate and access the same unsecured server again in
March 2017, at which time Grayson notified a KSU faculty member
and the University Information Technology System (UITS), which
was able to establish a protective firewall to isolate the server that
same day.8
Although DRE voting machines have been almost entirely
abandoned in the U.S. because of vulnerabilities like the ones Lamb
exposed in August 2016,9 Georgia had once been on the cutting-edge
of voting technology when it became the first state to adopt a DRE
system in 2002.10 Prompted by Florida’s mishandling of votes in the
2000 presidential election,11 Senator Jack Hill (R-4th) sponsored
legislation in February 2001 that among other things created the 21st
Century Voting Commission to evaluate voting equipment
alternatives and make quick recommendations to the General
Assembly.12 In 2002, after the Commission issued a final report later
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/07/18/mueller-indictments-georgia-votinginfrastructure-219018 [https://perma.cc/QBG3-V74B].
6. Id.
7. Id. It may be impossible to ever know if anyone other than Lamb accessed Georgia’s central
server system and databases, as four days after a lawsuit was filed against CES officials, the server and
all backups were erased in what then-Secretary of State Brian Kemp (R) called “standard operating
procedure.” Id.; see also Frank Bajak, Georgia Election Server Wiped After Suit Filed, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Oct.
26,
2017),
https://www.apnews.com/877ee1015f1c43f1965f63538b035d3f
[https://perma.cc/BM52-PZCG].
8. Complaint at 1–10, 81, Curling v. Kemp I, No. 2017-CV-292233 (Fulton Co. Super. Ct. July 3,
2017).
9. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., SECURING THE VOTE: PROTECTING AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 58 (2018), https://doi.org/10.17226/25120 [https://perma.cc/U9UX-WQAN].
10. SECURE, ACCESSIBLE & FAIR ELECTIONS (SAFE) COMMISSION REPORT 14 (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://sos.ga.gov/admin/uploads/SAFE_Commission_Report_FINAL_(1-10-18).pdf
[https://perma.cc/LPR3-WJ8T] [hereinafter SAFE REPORT]; Nakashima, supra note 3.
11. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4; SRC Study Contributes to Georgia Election Reform, 23 J.
SOUTHERN
REGIONAL
COUNCIL
13,
13–14
(2001), http://southernchanges.digitalscholarship.emory.edu/sc23-1_1204/sc23-1_006/
[https://perma.cc/7TH9-9GC3] [hereinafter SRC Study].
12. SRC Study, supra note 11; Georgia General Assembly, SB 213, Bill Tracking,
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20012002/SB/213. At the time the 21st Century
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that year recommending DRE voting machines for in-person voting
and an optical scan system for absentee voting by mail,13 Georgia
became the first state in the country to use DRE voting machines.14
Over seventeen years later, however, Georgia was one of the last five
states to still use the antiquated and highly vulnerable DRE system.15
The discoveries by Lamb and Christopher Grayson in 2016 and
2017—bolstered by concerns about Russia’s interference in the 2016
presidential election and an alarming increase in reports of the
insecurities of DRE voting machines that generate no auditable paper
trail—brought Georgia’s continued use of the DRE system to the
forefront of both legislative and judicial attention.16
In July 2017, several voters and an election integrity advocacy
organization filed a lawsuit against then-Secretary of State Brian
Kemp (R) and other elections officials in state court to enjoin any
future use of DRE voting machines in Georgia.17 Additional lawsuits
against Kemp and various elections officials ensued, challenging a
range of state elections practices including both the use of DRE
voting machines as well as the “exact match” rule.18
Voting Commission began meeting, Georgia experienced a pervasive lack of uniformity, relying on four
different ballot systems across its 159 counties: lever machines, paper and scanning machines,
punch-out ballots, and pen and paper. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4. See generally Frances
Conway Pratt, Elections and Primaries Generally, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 96 (2001).
13. REPORT
OF
THE
21ST
CENTURY
VOTING
COMMISSION
38
(2001),
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/VotingSystems/files/2015/21stCenturyReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EGR-6W3W].
14. Statement from Kathy Rogers, Dir. of Election Admin., Ga. Office of Sec’y of State, to U.S.
Election Assistance Commission (May 5, 2004). After DRE machines were implemented, the number of
undervotes dropped from 3.5% in 2000 to 0.86% in 2002. Brit J. Williams & Merle S. King,
Implementing Voting Systems: The Georgia Method, 47 COMMS. ACM 39, 39–42 (2004). The 2019
SAFE Report touted the successful implementation of this technology as one of the primary reasons the
Commission wanted to keep an electronic ballot-marking device. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 9.
Deputy Division Director of the National Science Foundation Jeremy Epstein, in his personal capacity,
offered praise to the DRE system even in 2017 before the Georgia House Committee on Science and
Technology for being outstandingly accurate, albeit inexcusably vulnerable to hacking and malware,
thus necessitating its immediate abandonment. Video Recording of House Committee on Science and
Technology Meeting at 23 min., 27 sec. (Sept. 22, 2017) (remarks by Jeremy Epstein, Deputy Division
Director, National Science Foundation), https://youtu.be/OrnZEpyJzt4 [hereinafter House Science and
Technology Committee Video].
15. Curling v. Kemp, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2018); Nakashima, supra note 3.
16. See generally Election Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on H. Admin., 116th Cong.
(2019) (statement of Lawrence D. Norden, Deputy Dir., Democracy Program, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at
NYU Sch. of Law); NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 9, at 78.
17. Complaint at 6-8, Curling v. Kemp I, No. 2017-CV-292233 (Fulton Co. Super. Ct. July 3, 2017).
18. Curling
v.
Raffensperger,
ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY
INFO.
CTR.,
https://epic.org/amicus/voting/curling/default.html [https://perma.cc/6DY6-9E3G] (last visited Sept. 18,
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Shortly after Curling I was filed, the Georgia House of
Representatives Committee on Science and Technology met to
discuss suggestions for new voting machines.19 Two bills, House Bill
(HB) 680 and Senate Bill (SB) 403, were introduced in the following
2018 legislative session seeking to eliminate Georgia’s use of DRE
voting machines before specified election years; however, despite a
general consensus that DRE voting machines were outdated and
vulnerable to hacking,20 the state legislature failed to agree on
legislation updating the state’s election system prior to the closely
contested 2018 gubernatorial election.21 This failure prompted the
Curling plaintiffs to seek a preliminary injunction in August 2018
that would have required the state to switch to paper ballots at the
eleventh hour.22 Although a federal judge denied the preliminary
injunction, she found that the state’s continued reliance on the DRE
system “likely results in ‘a debasement or dilution of the weight of

2019) (discussing various ongoing lawsuits such as Common Cause of Georgia v. Kemp, Martin v.
Kemp, and Coalition for Good Governance v. Crittenden); see also Mark Niesse, Changes Coming to
Georgia Purges, Vote Counts and Voting Machines, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/measure-would-change-georgia-purges-votecounts-and-voting-machines/lk1muv5jrC5SXI1wt29dzN/ [https://perma.cc/RF6W-NS7F] [hereinafter
Changes Coming to Georgia]. The “exact match” rule previously disqualified a voter’s registration
application if his or her first name, last name, birth date, driver’s license number, or social security
number did not match the record on file with the Georgia Department of Driver Services or the federal
Social Security Administration. Id.
19. House Science and Technology Committee Video, supra note 14, at 17 min., 21 sec. (remarks by
Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)); SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3; Kristina Torres, Lawmakers Begin Talks
About How to Replace Georgia’s Aging Vote System, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/lawmakers-begin-talks-about-how-replacegeorgia-aging-vote-system/A1e4ryglB9XgSZv1Dbb2GJ/ [https://perma.cc/UF9Y-LGME].
20. House Science and Technology Committee Video, supra note 14, at 34 min., 42 sec. (remarks by
Jeremy Epstein, Deputy Division Director, National Science Foundation).
21. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 680, May 10, 2018; State of Georgia Final
Composite Status Sheet, SB 403, May 10, 2018. HB 680, a bipartisan bill that died in the House, would
have prohibited use of DREs after January 1, 2019. Mark Niesse, Lawmakers Propose Switching
Georgia from Digital to Paper Ballots, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/lawmakers-propose-switching-georgia-fromdigital-paper-ballots/DnMzFdOpB2fA52cZt8D4xO/# [https://perma.cc/JS9K-C7XT]. Senate Bill 403
was a Republican bill that both chambers passed and would have allowed DREs to be used until January
1, 2024; however, the chambers could not agree on a single version. Mark Niesse, Bill to Replace
Georgia’s Electronic Voting Machines Falls Short, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/bill-replace-georgia-electronic-votingmachines-falls-short/E3Y3rDmP3WhtbYRvKnaGGK/ [https://perma.cc/L4DY-6BKM].
22. Curling v. Kemp, 334 F.Supp.3d 1303, 1322 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2018) (quoting Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000)). As this matter remains ongoing at the time of this writing, this publication is
not likely to reflect its current status.
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[Plaintiffs’] vote[s],’”23 and warned the State defendants that “further
delay is not tolerable in their tackling the challenges before the
State’s election balloting system.”24
Simultaneously, the Secure, Accessible & Fair Elections (SAFE)
Commission, commenced in April 2018 by Kemp, was meeting to
evaluate options available to replace DRE voting machines and set
guidelines for the General Assembly to adopt a new system in the
2019 legislative session, noting time constraints imposed by the
pending Curling lawsuit.25 Of the SAFE Commission’s eight
recommendations, the one point on which the Commission was not
unanimous was also its most significant—that the state should adopt
ballot-marking devices (BMDs) with verifiable paper ballots.26 The
lone cybersecurity expert on the Commission, Dr. Wenke Lee,
strongly dissented on that point, maintaining that not only are
hand-marked ballots much more secure than ones marked with
BMDs, but also that no studies support that voters actually verify
their ballots before submitting them, which is of paramount
importance in any device-generated ballot.27
Over criticism from various cybersecurity experts and election
systems professionals, SAFE Commission Co-Chair and State
Representative Barry Fleming (R-121st) introduced HB 316.28 In
accordance with the Commission’s recommendations, the bill sought
to authorize and require the State to adopt a new voting system as
soon as possible that would be conducted on an electronic
ballot-marking device that generates a printed, human readable paper

23. Id. at 1326.
24. Id. at 1327.
25. See generally SAFE REPORT, supra note 10. The final SAFE Commission report noted that it was
“aware of the court order in Curling v. Kemp [that] strongly suggest[ed] that if Georgia does not update
its voting system soon, a new system will be ordered.” Id. at 8. The Commission further stated that it
was unanimous in its belief that “Georgia voters would be better served by a process that goes through
their elected representatives in the General Assembly rather than be subjected to a system that is simply
ordered by a federal judge.” Id.
26. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 13.
27. Id. at 15–16.
28. Jim Galloway, In HB 316, House GOP Leaders Concede that Stacey Abrams Had a Point,
Atlanta J.-Const. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/316-house-gop-leaders-concedethat-stacey-abrams-had-point/dpWD8iSJ7xSoJBMbLFYi1L/# [https://perma.cc/B8GX-W4K2].
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ballot for scanning.29 HB 316 also sought to address issues of voter
eligibility and removal from the state registry due to inactivity.30
Bill Tracking of HB 316
Consideration and Passage by the House
Representative Barry Fleming (R-121st) sponsored HB 316 in the
House, where the bill was assigned to the House Committee on
Governmental Affairs.31 HB 316 was first read on the House Floor on
February 15, 2019.32 After three days and nearly ten hours of
testimony before the Elections Subcommittee, HB 316 advanced to
the House Government Affairs Committee on February 21, 2019,
where it was reported out favorably by substitute with a vote of 13 to
6.33
During the course of these public deliberations, House Minority
Leader Bob Trammell (D-132nd), speaking before the House
Governmental Affairs Elections Subcommittee, vocalized his
opposition to the bill specifically in regards to the implementation of
BMDs.34 In doing so, Leader Trammell relied upon and cited the
opinions of cybersecurity experts who have expressed concerns about
BMDs’ vulnerabilities to electronic hacking.35 Despite these
objections, new amendments were also introduced, such as Leader
Trammell’s proposal to allow voter applicant registrations to still be
processed, rather than placed in pendency status, when an applicant’s
registration does not mirror a certain state or federal database
record.36 Additionally, Representative Scot Turner (R-21st)
29. Video Recording of House Governmental Affairs Election Subcommittee Meeting at 21 min., 19
sec. (Feb. 19, 2019) (remarks by Rep. Barry Fleming (R-121st)), https://youtu.be/0eAe3YpLVbs
[hereinafter House Subcommittee Video].
30. Id.
31. Georgia General Assembly, HB 316, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/enUS/Display/20192020/HB/316 [hereinafter HB 316, Bill Tracking].
32. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 316, May 15, 2019.
33. Stephen Fowler, Voting Machine Bill Clears House Committee, GPB NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.gpbnews.org/post/voting-machine-bill-clears-house-committee
[https://perma.cc/P83T955E].
34. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 1 hr., 12 min., 18 sec. (remarks by Rep. Bob
Trammell (D-132nd)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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co-authored a risk-limiting project for post-election audits.37
Representative Turner, however, also unsuccessfully led a failed
motion to table the bill in order to give subcommittee members more
time to assess the full scope of HB 316.38
Democratic opposition continued while the bill was on the House
Floor; for example, Representative Jasmine Clark (D-108th)
advocated for a switch to hand-marked paper ballots that would be
scanned and deposited in a box for audits and recounts.39 In addition
to eliminating the threat of electronic hacking, Representative Clark
touted the lower implementation costs to this methodology.40
Nevertheless, on February 26, 2019, after more than two hours of
debate,41 the House passed HB 316 by a vote of 101 to 72.42 Voting
was conducted predominantly along party lines.43
Consideration and Passage by the Senate
Senator William Ligon (R-3rd) sponsored HB 316 in the Senate.44
After its first reading on February 27, 2019, Lieutenant Governor
Geoff Duncan (R) referred HB 316 to the Senate Committee on
Ethics.45 On March 7, 2019, the Ethics Committee favorably reported
the bill by substitute, and the bill was read for a second time the
following day.46 On March 13, 2019, after a successful party-line
vote to engross the bill, HB 316 was read a third time and passed 35
37. Id. at 1 hr., 6 min., 17 sec. (remarks by Rep. Scot Turner (R-21st)).
38. Id.
39. Video Recording of House Proceedings at 57 min., 9 sec. (Feb. 26, 2019) (remarks by Rep.
Jasmine Clark (D-108th)), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnLGFNWwl4s [hereinafter House
Proceedings Video].
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 316, Vote #78 (Feb. 26, 2019).
43. Id.; see also House Proceedings Video, supra note 29, at 1 hr., 51 min., 8 sec. (remarks by Rep.
Jasmine Clark (D-108th) and Rep. James Beverly (D-143rd)). During deliberations while the Bill was
on the House Floor, Democrats, such as Representative Clark, continued to express their security
concerns regarding the vulnerability of bar codes and BMDs as secure tabulating and audit devices. Id.
Further, Representative Beverly reiterated objections to the estimated $150 million cost of acquiring
these new BMDs by calling the equipment instead “ballot money devices” and implying the bill was
designed to benefit a specific voting equipment vendor. Id. Representative Beverly further echoed
previous sentiments regarding the safety measures of hand-marked paper ballots and touted the financial
savings that accompany this method of election voting. Id.
44. HB 316, Bill Tracking, supra note 31.
45. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 316, May 22, 2019.
46. Id.
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to 21,47 each member voting with their respective party.48 The House
agreed to the Senate substitute the following day by a vote of 101 to
69.49
The Act
The Act amends Chapter 2 of Title 21 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated, relating to primaries and elections, by
authorizing and requiring a new voting system to be used in all
elections. It also provides for auditing procedures and updates to the
voter list maintenance laws. Further, the Act specifies several
revisions to election processes. The purpose of the Act, according to
its author, is to “move [Georgia] into the twenty-first century with
commonsense reform and a straightforward voting system” by
“uniformly updat[ing] Georgia’s voting system and incorporat[ing]
an all new paper ballot component.”50
47. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 316, May 22, 2019; Georgia Senate Voting
Record, HB 316, #183, 186 (Mar. 13, 2019). Senate Minority Leader Steve Henson (D-41st) objected
that HB 316 was out of order for violating both Senate Rule 3-1.4 and O.C.G.A. § 28-5-42 in failing to
be accompanied with a fiscal note. Video Recording of Senate Proceedings at 1 hr., 15 min., 56 sec.
(Mar.
13,
2019)
(remarks
by
Sen.
Steve
Henson
(D-41st)),
https://livestream.com/accounts/26021522/events/7940809/videos/188633474
[hereinafter
Senate
Proceedings Video]. According to the O.C.G.A. § 28-5-42, “[a]ny bill having a significant impact on the
anticipated revenue or expenditure level of any . . . state agency must be introduced no later than the
twentieth day of any session,” and the sponsor must request a fiscal note on such bills “by November 1
of the year preceding the annual convening of the General Assembly in which the bill is to be
introduced . . . .” The Lieutenant Governor ruled, however, that HB 316’s fiscal impact had been
sufficiently addressed in the state’s Fiscal Year 2020 budget. Id. at 1 hr., 17 min., 30 sec. (remarks by
LG Geoff Duncan (R)). Senator Henson further objected to HB 316 as out of order for violating
O.C.G.A. § 28-5-49, which requires a fiscal note to attach bills with local impact of greater than $5
million. Id. at 1 hr., 18 min., 07 sec. (remarks by Sen. Henson (D-41st)). Although the Lieutenant
Governor denied the motion, finding that no evidence was presented that would exceed the aggregate
cap in O.C.G.A. § 28-5-49, Senator Henson moved to challenge the ruling of the chairperson “out of an
abundance of caution” and to waive the requirements pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 28-5-49(c)(2). Id. at 1 hr.,
18 min., 24 sec. The Senate voted along party lines to waive requirement of a local impact fiscal note.
Id. at 1 hr., 20 min., 20 sec. Documents from the Secretary of State’s Office show that the actual costs of
replacing Georgia’s voting machine system vary greatly by vendor. See Stephen Fowler, Here’s What
Vendors Say It Would Cost to Replace Georgia’s Voting System, GPB NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.gpbnews.org/post/here-s-what-vendors-say-it-would-cost-replace-georgia-s-voting-system
[https://perma.cc/F8NE-43U9].
48. Georgia Senate Voting Record, HB 316, #186 (Mar. 13, 2019); Senate Proceedings Video, supra
note 47, at 1 hr., 21 min., 46 sec. (remarks by Sen. William Ligon (R-3rd)).
49. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 316, #233 (Mar. 14, 2019).
50. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 2 min., 15 sec. (remarks by Rep. Barry Fleming
(R-121st)).
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Section 1
Section 1 revises paragraphs (2), (4.1), and (18) of Code section
21-2-2 by adding definitions necessary to adopt and implement a new
voting system, including “ballot scanner” and “electronic ballot
marker.”51 It also amends the definition of “official ballot” to include
ballots that are read by ballot scanners, rather than by optical
scanning tabulators.52 Although the Act now permits an “official
ballot” to include “paper,” “mechanical,” or “electronic” ballots, in
the event a paper ballot is scanned by a barcode, the amended
terminology does not specifically mention whether the physical paper
ballot or electronic barcode will be the official source.53 Opponents
to the Act contend this ambiguity amounts to a fatal omission
because a physical paper ballot may show an elector voted for certain
candidates, yet an electronic barcode may produce an opposite
selection because electronic voting equipment has been susceptible to
cyber hacking or vote manipulation.54
Section 2
Section 2 amends paragraph (15) of subsection (a) of Code section
21-2-50 to remove “direct recording electronic (DRE),” thereby
allowing the Secretary of State to implement a new type of voting
system.55
Section 3
Section 3 adds a new Code section that details the process for
independent candidates for the offices of President and Vice
President to qualify Electoral College electors for President and Vice
President.56

51. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 1, at 8.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 1 hr., 12 min., 18 sec. (remarks by Rep. Bob
Trammell (D-132nd)).
55. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 2, at 8.
56. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 3, at 8–9.
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Section 4
Section 4 revised paragraph (5) of subsection (c) of Code section
21-2-172 to require that, for the nomination of candidates by
convention, a certified copy of convention minutes be filed by
nominees along with a nomination petition, instead of with a notice
of candidacy.57
Section 5
Section 5 amends subsections (a) and (c) of Code section 21-2-216
and states that electors who will be eighteen years old by the date of
the primary or election in which they are seeking to vote will now be
allowed to vote, including by mail and by early voting.58
Additionally, the new language allows for registration of individuals
who will be, but are not yet, eighteen years old on or before the date
of a primary of election, if the person will reach eighteen years of age
within six months after the day of registration.59 This new provision
will allow, for example, first-year college students who are not yet
eighteen years old to register and request an absentee ballot if they
will be eighteen years old before voting election day.60
Section 6
Section 6, known as the “exact match” policy, amends subsections
(b), (c), and (d) of Code section 21-2-220.1, which previously
required consistency across all state documents to verify voter
identity.61 Subsection (b) now allows an applicant to be registered
even if his or her first name, last name, birth date, driver’s license
number, or social security number does not match the records of the
Georgia Department of Driver Services or the federal Social Security

57. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 4, at 9.
58. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 5, at 9–10.
59. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-216(c) (2019).
60. James Swift, Elections Officials Highlight Voting, Registration Changes, DAILY TRIB. NEWS
(May 21, 2019), http://daily-tribune.com/stories/elections-officials-highlight-voting-registrationchanges,22248 [https://perma.cc/N9L5-F8KE].
61. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 6, at 10.
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Administration.62 Discrepancies between documents, such as
hyphenated last names, maiden names, and married names, placed
approximately 50,000 voter registration applications on pending
status ahead of the 2018 elections.63 Consequently, reducing the strict
requirements of the previous law became a focal point of the
legislation. With the passage of the Act, applicants now will become
active voters, and rather than disqualifying applicants immediately,
any inconsistencies will be noted in voting records and will only
require flagged individuals to show photo identification that meets
exact-match standards before casting a vote.64 Given the enormous
implications that accompany election results and narrow outcome of
decisions, the weakening of the “exact match” rule ensures slight
discrepancies will no longer prevent voter eligibility.
Section 7
Section 7 revises Code section 21-2-225 and adds a new
subsection allowing the Secretary of State to join a nongovernmental
entity and share and exchange registration information to improve the
accuracy and efficiency of the voter registration system.65 This new
section further allows the Secretary of State to share confidential and
exempt information once becoming a member of such a
nongovernmental entity.66 Membership, however, is reduced to only
entities operated and controlled by the participating jurisdictions and
does not extend to entities under the control of the federal
government or any entity acting on behalf of the federal
government.67 Further, the new amendments permit the Secretary of
State to terminate the membership at any time.68 Moreover, upon
becoming a member of such a nongovernmental entity, the
Department of Driver Services is permitted to share driver’s license
and identification card information related to voter eligibility to the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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Secretary of State to further assess voter registration information.69
Because of the sensitivity of personal information shared, any
information received in conjunction with the Secretary of State’s
membership is required to be confidential and will only be made
available subject to a court order.70
As a result of the amendment, Georgia joined the Electronic
Registration Information Center (ERIC), which serves to share voter
registration information amongst various participating states.71 By
sharing information, ERIC protects the accuracy and current status of
state voting lists and aims to prevent election fraud.72 Upon joining
ERIC, Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger (R) described the
newfound membership status as a “tremendous step forward for the
integrity of Georgia’s voter rolls” and a move that brings Georgia “to
the forefront of election security.”73 Notably, ERIC does not remove
individuals from any state voting registry, but rather aims to prevent
individual voters from registering to vote in multiple states across the
country and notifies its members of such dual registration.74
Section 8
Section 8 amends subsection (a) of Code section 21-2-230 and
removes the reference to DRE voting equipment to allow any elector
of the county or municipality to challenge the right of any other
elector of the county or municipality, whose name appears on the list
of electors, to vote.75 The new language allows for such challenges to
be made under the new voting system.

69. Id. § 21-2-225(d).
70. Id. § 21-2-225(d)(5).
71. Swift, supra note 60.
72. Id.
73. Mark Niesse, Deeper Findings: Georgia Joints Multi-State Voter Registration and Cancellation
Effort, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 22, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/georgia-joins-multi-state-voter-registration-and-cancellationeffort/Z0yLAHuQLqH2KsmTPRh1aJ/ [https://perma.cc/8SQU-4R8P] [hereinafter Deeper Findings].
74. Id.
75. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 8, at 11.
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Section 9
Section 9 amends subsection (c) of Code Section 21-2-231 and
provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit the names of
individuals who have been convicted of a felony to the appropriate
county board of registrars.76 Once received, the county board of
registrars will mail a notice to the felons’ last known address and
alert such people that the county board of registrar has been informed
of a felony and conviction and will remove the convicted felon from
the electoral list thirty days after the notice date.77 However, the Act
provides that the thirty-day removal period may be paused if such
individuals request a hearing before the board of registrars to discuss
his or her removal.78 This new amendment essentially creates a more
streamlined process for informing convicted felons of their removal
from the state voter roll but, in conjunction with the overall spirit of
the Act, also seeks to prevent unauthorized or unwarranted voter
removal by giving such individuals the opportunity to communicate
directly with the board of registrars.
Section 10
Section 10 of the Act revises subsection (b) of Code section
21-2-232 and relates to the process by which the Secretary of State or
the board of registrars may remove a voter from the Georgia state
registry once a Georgia resident moves to another state and registers
to vote in that state.79 Previously, the language provided that once a
former Georgian moved to another state and registered to vote in the
different state, the Secretary of State or board of registrars could
remove such elector’s name from the list of electors without
notifying the voter, so long as the new state registration officials sent
a notice of cancellation reflecting the registration of the elector in the
new state.80 The amendment to paragraph (b)(1), however, now
provides that the Secretary of State or board of registrars can only
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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remove a voter in such a circumstance without providing a
confirmation notice when the new state officials send “a notice of
cancellation reflecting the registration of the elector in the other state,
which includes a copy of such elector’s voter registration application
bearing the elector’s signature.”81 Thus, the Act effectively adds an
additional requirement for removing a voter from the Georgia voting
registry without notice. Additionally, this amendment effectively
works in tandem with Georgia’s newfound ability to join a
nongovernmental voter information agency, such as ERIC, and
allows the state to actively receive and share voter registration
information amongst twenty-five other states.82
Further, paragraph (b)(2) was added to provide guidance for when
a state sends the Georgia Secretary of State or board of registrars
notice without including a copy of an elector’s voter registration
application that bears the elector’s signature.83 In such instances, this
subsection requires that the Secretary of State or board of registrars
must send a confirmation notice to the elector.84
Section 11
Section 11 of the Act amends subsection (a) of Code section
21-2-234 and increases the time for which a voter, with whom the
state has had no contact, may be considered inactive for voting
purposes.85 Previously the Code defined the term “no contact” to
mean instances where an elector: has not filed an updated voter
registration card; has not filed a change of name or address; has not
signed a petition required by law to be verified by the election
superintendent of a county or municipality or the Secretary of State;
has not signed a voter’s certificate; or has not confirmed the elector’s
continuation at the same address during the preceding three calendar
years.86 The Act amends paragraph (a)(1) to include instances where
an elector “has not submitted an absentee ballot application or voted
an absentee ballot” to the list of activities that constitute “no
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

§ 21-2-232(b)(1).
Deeper Findings, supra note 73.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 10, at 12.
§ 21-2-232(b)(2).
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 11, at 12.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234(a)(1) (Supp. 2017).
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contact.”87 Further, paragraph (a)(1) increases the temporal
requirements that constitute “no contact” from three years to five
years.88 Georgia is only one of a handful of states that has a “Use it or
Lose it” voter rule where inactive voters are removed from state
voting registries.89 Previously, in July 2017, over 107,000 Georgians
were removed from state voter rolls due to inactive voting histories.90
Effectively, Georgia voters will now be removed from the state voter
registry after nine years of inactivity, whereas the previous law
allowed for removal after seven years.
Section 12
Section 12 of the Act amends subsection (b) and requires an
additional notice letter be sent to an elector’s address and provides a
timeline for notifying inactive voters who have made no contact of
their impending removal from the list of electors.91 The Act provides
that “not less than 30 nor more than 60 days prior to the date on
which the elector is to be removed from the inactive list of electors,
the board of registrars shall mail a notice to the address on the
elector’s registration record.”92 This amendment augments the
changes made to the “Use it or Lose it” provisions in subsection (a)
of Code section 21-2-234 and simply provides another mechanism
for further prolonging the period for which a voter will remain on the
voting rolls.
Section 13
Section 13 amends subsection (c) of Code Section 21-2-262 and
increases the notice time that must be provided for the “division,

87. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 11, at 12.
88. § 21-2-232(a)(1).
89. Johnny Kauffman, Georgia Governor Signs Law to Slow ‘Use It or Lose It’ Voter Purges, APM
REP. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.apmreports.org/story/2019/04/11/georgia-brian-kemp-use-it-or-loseit-voting-law-changes [https://perma.cc/8UYX-CF4S].
90. Morgan Gstalter, 107,000 Purged from Georgia Voter Rolls for Not Voting in Past Elections,
HILL (Oct. 19, 2018, 9:15 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/412195-georgia-purged-morethan-100000-people-from-voter-rolls-because-there-didnt [https://perma.cc/J8RT-DWJ7].
91. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 12, at 12–13.
92. § 21-2-235(b).
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redivision, alteration, formation, or consolidation of precincts.”93
Previously, any plan to change or consolidate the number of precincts
required at least ten days’ notice in the legal organ of the county.94
The amendment increases this notice period to at least thirty days and
further adds the requirement that a copy of such notice shall be
immediately submitted to the Secretary of State.95 Instances of
last-minute precinct closings occurred before the 2018 elections,
which in turn raised questions concerning voter suppression.
Randolph County, for example, closed seven of the county’s nine
voting precincts just days before the November election.96 Although
the Randolph County Board of Elections claimed the closings
centered on American’s with Disability Act (ADA) compliance
issues and potential health hazards, voting activists claim the poll
closures were an attempt to suppress voter turnout in a county with a
60% African-American population.97 The increased notice time
should give voters more time to prepare and coordinate their
commute to available precincts and may help alleviate some concerns
about voter suppression.
Section 14
Section 14 amends Code section 21-2-265 and prevents counties
from changing the location of a polling place during the sixty days
before a general or primary election or changing the location of a
polling place in the thirty-day period preceding any special primary,
special election, or runoff from such types of elections.98 The Act,
however, provides that in the event of an emergency or event that
renders a polling place “unavailable for use,” such temporal

93. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 13, at 13.
94. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-262(c) (Supp. 2017).
95. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-262(c) (2019).
96. Legislature Takes Holistic Look at Voting System, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019,
3:57 PM), https://www.savannahnow.com/opinion/20190221/editorial-legislature-takes-holistic-look-atvoting-system [https://perma.cc/U6HY-NHVN].
97. Ashley Bridges, Georgia County to Close 7 of 9 Voting Precincts, Civil Rights Attorney Calls it
‘Voter Suppression’, WJBF (Aug. 16, 2018, 4:23 PM), https://www.wjbf.com/news/georgianews/georgia-county-to-close-7-of-9-voting-precincts-civil-rights-attorney-calls-it-voter-suppression/
[https://perma.cc/LS3G-85T5].
98. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 14, at 13.
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restrictions are inapplicable.99 The closing and changing of polling
locations in the weeks prior to the 2018 Georgia election cycle
became a hot topic between Democrats and Republicans as thousands
of polling places were closed while others suffered staffing shortages
for alleged cost savings.100 Although cost savings were cited as the
driving force for closing many of the polling locations, critics of the
former policy claimed the widespread dissolution was, on the
contrary, a political tool used to prevent voting in predominately
African-American neighborhoods.101 This new amendment
effectively locks in polling places before the election and ensures
voters will not unexpectedly encounter vacant polling locations.
Further, unexpected or abrupt polling closures compound voting
inefficiencies by increasing wait times at active polling locations and
thus effectively discourage voting.
Section 15
Section 15 adds “electronic ballot markers” to provisions for
polling places but does not remove the ability to have direct
recording electronic units.102
Section 16
Subsection (b) of Code section 21-2-286 is amended to provide
that the Secretary of State will prescribe how ballots must be
designed to “ensure ease of reading by electors.”103 This additional
language requires the Secretary of State to select a vendor for the
new voting equipment that produces a ballot that is clearly and easily

99. § 21-2-265(f).
100. Mark Nichols, Closed Voting Sites Hit Minority Counties Harder for Busy Midterm Elections,
USA TODAY (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:06 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/10/30/midtermelections-closed-voting-sites-impact-minority-voter-turnout/1774221002/
[https://perma.cc/HB3PNFSG].
101. Matt Vasilogambros, Polling Places in Black Communities Continue to Close Ahead of
November
Elections,
GOVERNING
(Sept.
5,
2018,
9:51
AM),
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/sl-polling-place-close-ahead-of-november-elections-blackvoters.html [https://perma.cc/F6BU-Y3JD].
102. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 15, at 14.
103. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 16, at 14.
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legible for voters.104 Although on the surface this new provision may
seem straightforward, voter verification of the new, printed ballots
was a central issue during the research and legislative drafting
process.105 As such, depending on the vendor that is ultimately
selected, the format and readability of the new paper ballots could
become contested topics in the future if electors are not comfortable
with these paper receipts.
Section 17
Section 17 revises Code section 21-2-293 relating to errors and
omissions that occur in the printing of official ballots or in the
programing display of the official ballots by adding “electronic ballot
markers” to the type of voting system that election officials and
courts may correct if necessary and under specified conditions.106
The change in this section is merely a procedural addition necessary
to ensure an election superintendent can correct any discovered
mistakes or omissions occurring in the printing or programming
display of electronic ballot markers.
Section 18
Section 18 revises subsection (a) of Code section 21-2-300 and
stipulates that once the Secretary of State certifies new voting
equipment as safe and practicable for use, all federal, state, and
county general primaries and general elections, as well as special
primaries and special elections, must be conducted with the use of
scanning ballots.107 These scanning ballots must be marked by
electronic ballot markers and tabulated using ballot scanners for
voting at polls and absentee ballots cast in person, provided that such
electronic ballot markers must produce paper ballots marked with the
elector’s choices in a readable format.108 Further, paragraph (a)(3)
requires the state to furnish electronic ballot markers and ballot
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 15–16.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 17, at 14–15.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 18, at 15.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-300 (2019).
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scanners to each county as soon as possible.109 Such equipment must
be certified by the United States Election Assistance Commission
prior to purchase, lease, or acquisition.110 Paragraph (a)(3) also
provides that the governing authorities of a county or municipality
may choose to acquire, purchase, or lease additional electronic ballot
markers and ballot scanners at their own expense.111 Moreover,
paragraph (a)(4) grants the Secretary of State the power to test and
evaluate the new equipment in primaries and elections occurring in
Georgia.112
In addition to their concerns about election accuracy, critics
protested the Act from an economic perspective.113 The Act
effectively requires the Secretary of State to purchase a total of
nearly 40,000 new touchscreen computers, printers, and scanners.114
Further, the new BDMs will require training for new supervisors as
well as ongoing software licensing renewals and upgrades.115 To
finance the estimated $150 million cost of these expenditures, the
House authorized for $150 million in twenty-year bonds to cover the
purchase.116
Due to concerns about verifiability and accuracy of BMDs, many
critics believe the lack of improvement in voting integrity does not
justify the investment in any new electronic equipment.117 Rather,
they contend that a return to hand-written ballots is not only a safer,
more reliable voting mechanism, but additionally is a cheaper
alternative.118
Moreover, opponents contend that although the state will furnish
the original equipment, the Act will increase operating costs for
109. § 21-2-300(a)(3).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. § 21-2-300(a)(4).
113. Jeanne Dufort, H.B. 316 Voting Machine Bill a Mistake, INSIDERADVANTAGE (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://insideradvantage.com/2019/03/05/h-b-316-voting-machine-bill-a-mistake/
[https://perma.cc/L25P-XX53].
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Wes Wolfe, Contentious Voting Bill Passes Senate, BRUNSWICK NEWS (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://thebrunswicknews.com/news/local_news/contentious-voting-bill-passes-senate/article_13c51cc57a20-5512-9f6d-bf3a0d88348c.html [https://perma.cc/JQ7R-XEL7].
117. House Proceedings Video, supra note 39, at 1 hr., 51 min., 8 sec. (remarks by Rep. James
Beverly (D-143rd)).
118. Id. at 57 min., 9 sec. (remarks by Rep. Jasmine Clark (D-108th)).
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elections due to additional printing costs from the generation of a
paper ballot, periodic software license renewals, and increased audit
costs.119 Traditionally, counties bear the costs of these expenditures,
and the Act notably lacks any provision or guidance on who will
account for these future expenses.120
Further, the Act is silent on the type of BMD that will be
furnished, and instead broadly grants the Secretary of State power to
contract with a voting machine company to provide the equipment.121
Although no vendor has been selected, voting machine company
Election Systems and Software (ES&S) is widely considered the
frontrunner for the contract.122 Opponents, however, have identified a
potential conflict of interest between ES&S and Georgia Governor
and former Secretary of State Brian Kemp’s deputy chief of staff,
Charles Harper.123 Mr. Harper was a registered lobbyist for ES&S
until June 2018, and his relationship and influence have drawn
criticisms of favoritism and self-dealing.124
Section 19
Section 19 amends paragraph (5) of Code section 21-2-365 to state
that a ballot scanner, and not an optical scanning tabulator, shall
preclude electors from voting for more candidates or more times than
allowed.125 This amendment updates the Code language to provide
for the same preclusions for ballot scanners that were present for
optical scanning tabulators as it pertains to extra-counting of votes
for candidates or offices.

119. Dufort, supra note 113.
120. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 18, at 15–16.
121. Id.
122. Anoa Changa, Georgia’s Voting Machine ‘Reform’ Is a Threat to Free and Fair Elections,
REWIRE.NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2019/04/03/georgias-votingmachine-reform-is-a-threat-to-free-and-fair-elections/ [https://perma.cc/6LYG-PC2X].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 19, at 16.
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Section 20
Section 20 amends Code section 21-2-367 and reduces the number
of voting booths per electors in a given county or municipality from
one voting booth per 200 electors to one voting booth per 250
electors.126 Section 20 further eliminates language that discontinued
the use of paper ballots in Georgia in 2002.127 The reduction in the
number of voting machines per elector is notable in that it could
foreseeably lead to longer waiting lines, as less machines are
available to accommodate electors. Although it is unclear if the new
machines will decrease the time it takes to cast a vote, this reduction
in available voting machines runs somewhat counter to the Act’s
general themes of improving voting accuracy and efficiency,
particularly as voter turnout is only expected to increase in the
coming years.128 Presumably, the reduction in available machines is a
cost measure, as the costs associated with providing the new voting
equipment is lessened by the reduction in the ratio of voter machines
to registered electors.
Section 21
Section 21 amends Code section 21-2-372 to require ballots to be
printed in a way suitable for ballot scanners instead of optical
scanners.129 This amendment merely updates the Code to
accommodate the specific nuances that accompany ballot scanners as
it relates to the printing of ballots and ballot arrangements.
Section 22
Section 22 further amends Code section 21-3-372 to require ballots
to be of suitable size and construction so as to permit reading by
ballot scanners instead of a tabulating machine.130 Again, this
126. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 20, at 16.
127. Id.
128. Mark Niesse, Voter Registration Surges in Georgia Ahead of 2020 Elections, ATLANTA
J.-CONST. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/voter-registrationsurges-georgia-ahead-2020-elections/NVKOTit4KEtsTHoXtd6ddN/# [https://perma.cc/3N93-29JL].
129. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 21, at 16.
130. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 22, at 17.
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amendment merely updates the Code to require ballot design, size,
and stock to accommodate the processing requirements associated
with ballot scanners as opposed to a tabulated machine.
Section 23
Section 23 amends subsections (a) and (b) of Code section
21-2-374 to require the proper programming to be placed in each
ballot scanner, instead of a tabulator, and to require the ballot
scanners to be tested and approved prior to use by electors in each
primary and general election.131 Section 23 further provides that a
ballot scanner will not be approved for use in a primary or election
until it has produced an errorless count.132
Section 24
Section 24 amends Code section 21-2-375 and requires election
superintendents to ensure directions are prominently posted with
signs reminding electors to verify their ballot choices prior to
inserting the scanning ballot into the ballot scanner and stating that
sample ballots are available upon request.133 This additional review
mechanism was a point of central contention in the drafting process,
as opponents of the Act contend that embedded barcodes are still
vulnerable to hacking and voters will not necessarily catch errors on
the printed ballots.134 These criticisms echo Dr. Wenke Lee’s
findings that voters have not been empirically shown to verify ballots
before submission, and thus any increase in voter confidence from
the switch to a paper receipt is merely illusory.135 Instead, these
opponents maintain hand-marked paper ballots, which would be
scanned and deposited in a box for audits and recounts, represent the
safest and most reliable voting mechanism.136 Although the Act was
131. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 23, at 17.
132. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-374(b) (2019).
133. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 24, at 17–18.
134. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 1 hr., 12 min., 18 sec. (remarks by Rep. Bob
Trammell (D-132nd)).
135. SAFE REPORT, supra note 10, at 15–16.
136. House Proceedings Video, supra note 39, at 57 min., 9 sec. (remarks by Rep. Jasmine Clark (D108th)).
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passed, the language and overall requirements of this section are
likely to be a point of contention going forward as critics of the Act
are likely to reassert their contentions that posted signs and reminders
are insufficient, impractical, or futile measures to ensure a voter
accurately and thoroughly reviews every selection that was chosen.
Section 25
Section 25 amends Code section 21-2-377, which provides for an
election superintendent to designate a person to have custody of
voting machines for storage purposes when the machines are not in
use and to provide compensation to such designated person.137
Additionally, Section 25 replaces “scanning tabulators” with “ballot
scanners.”138 Notably, however, the new language is silent as to the
source of the funding for these storage costs, and also entirely
neglects to detail any costs associated with transporting the new
equipment to the storage locations. Critics of the Act fear local
counties and municipalities will be forced to bear these operational
costs which represent separate expenses not contained in the State’s
estimated $150 million budget for this new equipment.139
Additionally, proponents of hand-marked paper ballots view such
ancillary costs associated with the new voting equipment as entirely
needless and a drain on taxpayer dollars.140
Section 26
Section 26 adds Code subsections 21-2-379.21 through
21-2-379.26 to ensure voters using BMDs have the same access to
information and privacy that existed under the former DRE
statutes.141 Additionally, subsection 21-2-379.23 now requires ballots
to include a candidate’s political party or affiliation in partisan
elections.142 It further requires ballots to have human readable text
137. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 25, at 18.
138. Id.
139. Dufort, supra note 113; see also House Proceedings Video, supra note 39, at 57 min., 9 sec.
(remarks by Rep. Jasmine Clark (D-108th)).
140. Dufort, supra note 113.
141. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 26, at 18–22.
142. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-379.23(c)(5) (2019).
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regarding potential voter selections and to identify instances when a
voter has not voted for a particular office, constitutional amendment,
or other selection appearing on a ballot.143
Importantly, subsection 21-2-379.23(d) specifies that the paper
ballot marked and printed by the electronic ballot marker constitutes
the official ballot and will be used for recount and audit purposes.144
Because the type of BMD to be used is not specified in the Act,
opponents who envision a barcode being used to tabulate votes
desired more clarity and specificity as to what ballot will be used in
such events, considering the Act only addresses “the paper ballot
marked” and does not specifically preclude reliance on embedded
barcode information.145 Stemming from their concern over the
security and vulnerability of barcodes to tabulate votes, opponents
believe reliance on a barcode for recount in audit purposes is useless
and unverifiable.146 Thus, opponents lament the fact that the law does
not specifically prohibit barcode data from being used in the event of
a recount.147
Section 27
Section 27 amends subparagraph (a)(1)(D) and subsection (b) of
Code section 21-2-381.148 Subparagraph (a)(1)(D) allows “electors in
custody in a jail or other detention facility in the county or
municipality” to request an absentee by mail ballot be mailed to an
address other than the permanent mailing address of the elector.149
Previously, only physically disabled electors were granted this
exception.150 Further, paragraph (b)(3) provides a new process for
instances where an absentee ballot application contains a mismatched
143. Id. § 21-2-379.25(a).
144. Id. § 21-2-379.23(d).
145. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 26, at 18–22.
146. Anjali Enjeti, Governor Kemp is Turning Georgia into Gilead, DAME MAG. (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.damemagazine.com/2019/04/01/governor-kemp-is-turning-georgia-into-gilead/
[https://perma.cc/7P4L-AX5J].
147. Gloria Tatum, Georgia Approves New E-Voting Regime, but Will Paper Record Be Utilized?,
ATLANTA PROGRESSIVE NEWS (May 2, 2019), http://atlantaprogressivenews.com/2019/05/02/georgiaapproves-new-e-voting-regime-questions-issues-remain/ [https://perma.cc/DDP2-BRJC].
148. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 27, at 22–23.
149. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(D) (2019).
150. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(D) (Supp. 2017).
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signature.151 The amendment provides that an absentee ballot
application will not be rejected due to “an apparent mismatch
signature between the signature of the elector on the application and
the signature of the elector on file with the board of registrars.”152
When such an instance occurs, the elector will have the opportunity
to cure the signature discrepancy “by submitting an affidavit to the
board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk along with a copy of one
of the forms of identification enumerated in subsection (c) of Code
[s]ection 21-2-417 before the close of the period for verifying
provisional ballots contained in subsection (c) of Code [s]ection
21-2-419.”153
Section 28
Section 28 amends subsection (a) of Code section 21-2-382 to
provide that counties will be able to use nongovernmental buildings
as early voting locations if the buildings are used as voting locations
on Election Day.154 The addition of the new language will potentially
allow for more physical locations to be used during the early voting
process while still ensuring these locations are suitable from an
occupational, safety, and privacy perspective. As voter turnout
continues to grow, many electors prefer to avoid the long waiting
lines that are frequently present on Election Day, and thus this
amendment will allow for better accessibility to accommodate early
voters.155
Section 29
Section 29 amends Code section 21-2-383 to provide that in
jurisdictions where electronic ballot markers are used in polling
places on Election Day, persons casting absentee ballots in person at
a registrar or absentee ballot clerk’s office shall use electronic ballot
markers.156
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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Section 30
Section 30 amends subsections (b) and (e) and paragraph (1) of
subsection (c) of Code section 21-2-384, clarifies the information
appearing on the envelopes containing absentee ballots, simplifies the
oath information to be provided for absentee ballots, and expands the
types of elections where electronic ballot delivery is available to
overseas and military voters.157 From a procedural standpoint, an
absentee voter receives two envelopes for each absentee ballot to
permit the placing of one envelope within the other and both within
the mailing envelope.158 Printed on the smaller envelope includes the
words “Official Absentee Ballot.”159 On the back of the larger of the
two envelopes to be enclosed within the mailing envelope shall be
printed the form of oath of the elector and the oath for persons
assisting electors.160 The new language to subsection (b) now
requires the larger of the two envelopes to display the elector’s name
and voter registration number.161
Further, under paragraph (c)(1), the oath requirements that
accompany an absentee ballot have been simplified to no longer
require an elector to provide his or her residential address or year of
birth, or, in the case of a person assisting an elector, the relationship
between the parties.162 Moreover, subsection (e) expands electronic
ballot delivery to overseas and military electors to include not only
federal elections, but also state and county elections, primaries, and
runoffs.163
Section 31
Section 31 amends Code section 21-2-385, which relates to
procedures for early voting and voting by absentee ballot.164 It
amends subsection (a) to prohibit ballot harvesting by persons
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 30, at 24–26.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 24.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-384(b) (2019).
Id. § 21-2-384(c)(1).
Id. § 21-2-384(e).
Id. § 21-2-385(a).
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unaffiliated with the voter, and now requires the elector to personally
mail or personally deliver his or her sealed official absentee ballot,
provided that the elector’s relatives, son-in-law, daughter-in-law,
mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, or an
individual residing in the household of the elector may still mail or
deliver the sealed ballot on the elector’s behalf.165 For disabled
electors, however, a caregiver, regardless of whether their residence
is the same as the elector’s, may mail or deliver the elector’s absentee
ballot.166 For electors in jail or other detention facilities, any
employee of that jail or facility and who has custody of the elector
may mail or deliver the elector’s absentee ballot.167
Subsection (b) now allows any person of a physically disabled or
illiterate elector’s choice to assist the elector in preparing his or her
ballot, so long as the person assisting is not the elector’s employer or
an officer or agent of the elector’s union.168 The elector may not
receive help from anyone whose name appears on the ballot as a
candidate in a primary, general election, or runoff.169 This provision
adopts the federal election voter assistance standard for disabled and
illiterate electors to also cover state and local elections during
absentee voting.
Additionally, Section 31 amends subsection (d) to set the second
Monday prior to a runoff as the deadline to begin early voting.170
Section 32
Section 32 revises subparagraphs (a)(1)(C) and (a)(1)(D) of Code
section 21-2-386. Subparagraph (C) provides a method for an elector
to cure issues with absentee ballots.171 The elector may submit an
affidavit to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk along with
a form of identification to cure a failure to sign the oath, an invalid
signature, or missing information.172 The affidavit must affirm that
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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the rejected elector submitted the absentee ballot in question and state
that the elector is registered and qualified to vote in the primary,
general election, or runoff in question.173 If the board of registrars or
absentee ballot clerk determines the affidavit and form of
identification are sufficient, then the elector’s absentee ballot will be
recorded.174 During the November 2018 elections, election officials
rejected over 7,000 absentee ballots due to signature mismatches,
missing birth dates and addresses, and incorrectly marked absentee
ballot envelopes.175 The changes made in this section mirror those in
Code section 21-2-220.1, which aimed to weaken the “exact-match”
policy that was responsible for the removal of over 50,000 separate
voters during the 2018 elections.176 Again, given the volume of
discarded absentee ballots and narrow election outcomes, this
amendment better helps ensure voting outcomes represent the will of
Georgia voters.
Further, subparagraph (D) adds a notification procedure for
absentee ballots that are devoid of the requisite identification
information and which subsequently are deemed provisional
ballots.177 The amendment requires the board of registrars or absentee
ballot clerk to promptly notify such an elector that his or her absentee
ballot has been deemed a provisional ballot and that the elector must
provide information on the necessary identification forms, as well as
the mechanics and timeline for providing such information to verify
the ballot.178
Section 33
Section 33 amends Code section 21-2-388 regarding the
cancellation of absentee ballots for voters who appear at an election
precinct during primaries and elections.179 First, Code section

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Mark Niesse, Election Battle Over Discarded Absentee Ballots Ends with New Georgia Law,
GOVERNING (July 12, 2019, 8:27 AM), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/tns-georgia-absenteeballot.html [https://perma.cc/3U9A-5MYL].
176. Changes Coming to Georgia, supra note 18.
177. § 21-2-386(a)(1)(D).
178. Id.
179. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 33, at 30.
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21-2-388 now allows electors who have received an absentee ballot
but who have not yet returned the ballot to cancel the absentee ballot
and vote in person.180 Second, paragraph (2) requires the elector to
first have the managers of the election precinct, the registrars, or the
absentee ballot clerk certify that the elector’s ballot has not yet been
received by the board of registrars before the elector may vote in
person at the election precinct.181 It further requires the elector to
surrender the absentee ballot to the poll manager or, if the elector did
not bring the absentee ballot to the election precinct, the elector must
destroy the absentee ballot after casting the in-person vote.182
Section 34
Section 34 amends subsection (b) of Code section 21-2-409 and
assists electors who cannot read English or who have disabilities.183
Subsection (b) removes the criteria relating to elections in which
there is a federal candidate on the ballot and now applies the federal
election voter assistance standard to state and local elections on
Election Day.184 As amended, the Act now provides help to any
elector who is entitled to receive assistance in voting under Code
section 21-2-409 and removes the provision that “no person shall
assist more than ten such electors in any primary, election, or runoff
covered by this paragraph.”185 Previously, during elections where
only state candidates appeared on a ballot, voters with a limited
English proficiency could only use an interpreter who was a close
family member, caretaker, or voter registered in the same precinct.186
The Act now allows such voters who require interpreters to bring
nearly anyone to help cast a ballot and mirrors the standard that
previously existed for federal elections.187 Further, the amendment
calls for “notice of the availability of such assistance [to] be
180. § 21-2-388.
181. Id. § 21-2-388(2).
182. Id.
183. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 34, at 30–31.
184. Id. at 31.
185. Id.
186. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409(b)(1) (Supp. 2017).
187. Mark Niesse, Lawsuit Fights Restrictions on Interpreters in Georgia Runoff, ATLANTA J.CONST. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/lawsuit-fightsrestrictions-interpreters-georgia-runoff/iLVggX2SOawyVhNyC5fzyJ/ [https://perma.cc/DEH4-59Z3].
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prominently posted at each polling place.”188 The new assistance
standard drastically increases the ability for a voter who requires
assistance to receive help in federal, state, and local elections.
Although employers and union representatives are still prevented
from aiding a voter, voters who qualify for assistance can now
receive familial and nonfamilial assistance.189
Section 35
Section 35 amends subsection (e) of Code section 21-2-413 to
extend the general prohibition of cameras or other recording devices
in polling places while voting is taking place to cover instances
where an elector is using an electronic ballot marker.190 The Act,
however, maintains the provision that allows the poll manager, at his
or her discretion, to allow such devices under certain conditions and
subject to certain limitations.191 Additionally, poll officials are still
permitted to use telephones and other monitoring devices for official
purposes.192
Section 36
Section 36 amends subsection (f) of Code section 21-2-417.1, and
now permits a Georgia voter identification card to remain valid even
if a voter moves to another address, so long as that voter still resides
in the same county and otherwise remains qualified to vote.193 If a
voter moves to another Georgia residence outside of the county in
which he or she was registered to vote, that voter must then surrender
his or her voter identification card to the board of registrars of the
county of his or her new residence.194

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

O.C.G.A. § 21-2-409(b) (2019).
Id.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 35, at 31.
§ 21-2-413(e).
Id.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 36, at 31–32.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417.1(f) (2019).
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Section 37
Section 37 amends subsection (e) of Code section 21-2-418 to
permit registrars to provide a free access system via internet website,
in addition to toll-free telephone numbers, for electors to check
whether their provisional ballot was counted and, if it was not
counted, the reason that the provisional ballot was rejected.195
Section 37 further requires counties timely report to the Secretary of
State when they receive a provisional ballot and whether they
counted it or rejected it, and, if it was rejected, the basis of that
rejection.196 The addition of these procedures stems partly from the
2018 gubernatorial election, where a federal judge ordered election
officials to review thousands of provisional ballots that were not
counted.197 In the midst of the close election, the judge provided for
the creation of a voter hotline where voters could call in to check if
their votes were counted.198 Further, the judge requested election
officials to review voter registrations and ordered reports from the
state government related to the uptick in provisional ballots from
previous years.199
Section 38
Section 38 amends Code section 21-2-419 to allow provisional
ballots to be cast on the same ballot type as is ordinarily used, rather
than the ballot used for mail-in absentee ballots.200 Section 38 also
amends subsection (b), which now requires a county’s board of
registrars to make a good faith effort in determining whether a voter
who casts a provisional ballot is entitled to vote in the primary or
election, and defines what “good faith effort” shall include.201 The
purpose of Section 38 is to provide uniformity by clearly stating that
195. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 37, at 32.
196. Id.
197. Mark Niesse, Judge Orders Review of Provisional Ballots in Georgia Election, ATLANTA J.CONST. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/judge-ordersreview-provisional-ballots-georgia-election/ZM2yd0QGkyZ8Zi1IyVpF3H/
[https://perma.cc/3ARTS8HE].
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 38, at 32–34.
201. Id. at 32–33.
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registrars should use all available information in reviewing whether a
provisional ballot should be counted, including information from the
Department of Driver Services, Department of Family and Children
Services, Department of Natural Resources, public libraries, and any
other government agency.202
Section 38 also adds language to subsection (d) that requires
timely notification of the status of persons’ provisional ballots and, if
the person was found to be qualified to vote, the registrars must
continue to provide the person with a voter registration form that
shall add them to the electors list.203 Overall, the changes made in
this section parallel many of the changes contained throughout the
Act, and seek to promote a more thorough, accurate, and timely
voting process.
Section 39
Section 39 amends Code section 21-2-482 to replace optical
scanners with ballot scanners and requires superintendents
sufficiently prepare absentee ballots in advance.204 The section
further permits the form for the ballots’ labels to conform with the
requirements of Article 9 of this Chapter or in such a form that will
allow the ballot to be machine tabulated.205 The amendments to this
section are procedure-oriented and officially sync the provisions
contained in the law to conform with the introduction of the new
voting equipment.206
Section 40
Section 40 amends subsection (k) of Code section 21-2-493 and
extends the deadline for certifying elections to the second Friday
following the date the election was held.207 The deadline was
formerly on the Monday following the date of the election, and the
deadline extension will grant election officials more time to audit the
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 32–34.
Id. at 33.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 39, at 34.
Id.
Id.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 40, at 34.
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results from an analytical perspective.208 Further, the amendment
grants the Secretary of State discretionary power to extend the
deadline if necessary to complete a precertification audit.209
Section 41
Section 41 amends subsections (a) and (c) of Code section
21-2-495, reducing the percentage threshold that triggers an
automatic recount from 1.0% to 0.5% and authorizing the State
Election Board (SEB) to promulgate rules and regulations for
implementing and administering the recount process.210 Previously, a
losing candidate was permitted to request an automatic recount if the
outcome was determined by 1% or less.211 Now, the Act lowers the
threshold for a candidate to be entitled to an automatic recount to
0.5%.212 In the hotly contested 2018 gubernatorial election, the
previous 1.0% automatic recount trigger was barely avoided, despite
protests, as Republican candidate Brian Kemp defeated Democratic
candidate Stacey Abrams by a final margin of 1.39%.213 Given that
this was the closest governor’s race in Georgia since 1966, the
reduction in the automatic trigger threshold is somewhat
confounding; however, proponents of the new BMDs voting system
believe the newfound audit capabilities permitted this figure to be
lowered.214 Critics of the Act, such as Richard DeMillo, a
Distinguished Professor of Computing at Georgia Institute of
Technology, maintain the cyber security vulnerabilities attributed to
BMDs do not produce a trustworthy audit trail and render the
automatic recount trigger irrelevant because the BMDs may not
accurately capture voter intent.215
208. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-493(k) (Supp. 2017).
209. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 40, at 34.
210. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 41, at 35–36.
211. § 21-2-495(c)(1).
212. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 41, at 35–36.
213. Aris Folley, Georgia Certifies Elections Results in Bitterly Fought Governor’s Race, HILL (Nov.
17, 2018, 11:21 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/417292-georgia-certifies-electionsresults-in-bitterly-fought-governors-race [https://perma.cc/5E2B-V5F9].
214. Alan Blinder & Richard Fausset, Stacey Abrams Ends Fight for Georgia Governor with Harsh
Words
for
Her
Rival,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/elections/georgia-governor-race-kemp-abrams.html
[https://perma.cc/A2NB-PS3M].
215. Electronic Mail Interview with Richard DeMillo, Distinguished Professor of Computing, Ga.

Published by Reading Room, 2019

35

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 6

116

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

Section 42
Section 42 amends Code section 21-2-498 and introduces the
criteria and procedural mechanisms for conducting precertification
tabulation audits for any federal or state general election.216
Subsection (b) calls for precertification audits to begin as soon as
possible but no later than the November 2020 general election.217
Local election superintendents are charged with conducting
precertification tabulation audits for federal or state general elections,
and the Act requires such audits be conducted via manual inspection
of random samples of the official paper ballots.218 Subsection (c)
enumerates many functions of local election superintendents,
including the requirements that such officials complete the audit prior
to final certification of the contest, ensure all types of ballots—in
person, absentee, and provisional—are included in the audit, provide
a report of the unofficial final tabulated vote results for the contest to
the public prior to conducting the audit, and provide details of the
audit to the public within forty-eight hours of completion.219
Subsection (d) authorizes the SEB to promulgate rules,
regulations, and procedures to implement and administer the
procedural mechanisms for conducting post-election audits, including
the maintenance and implementation of security procedures to ensure
voter accuracy throughout the audit process.220
Subsection (e) provides that the Secretary of State shall conduct a
risk-limiting audit pilot program to test the accuracy and feasibility of
these risk-limiting audits.221 If these risk-limiting audits test
successfully within five business days following the sample election
results, then all audits across the state are to be conducted in such a
manner no later than November 1, 2024.222

Inst. of Tech. (Aug. 23, 2019) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review) [hereinafter
DeMillo Interview].
216. 2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 42, at 36–37.
217. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-498(b) (2019).
218. Id. § 21-2-498(c).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 21-2-498(d).
221. Id. § 21-2-498(e).
222. Id.
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Section 43
Section 43 amends subsection (b) of Code section 21-2-499 to give
the Secretary of State an additional three days to tabulate, compute,
and canvass the votes cast for presidential electors and lay them
before the Governor and also gives an additional three days to the
Governor to certify the slates of presidential electors.223 As such, the
Secretary of State now must certify by the seventeenth day following
the presidential election, and the Governor must certify by the
eighteenth day following the election.224 By extending these
deadlines, the Act allows more time for the audit process and permits
a more thorough and exhaustive review procedure that favors
accuracy over prompt declarations for presidential election outcomes.
Moreover, this section still allows a superior court judge to alter these
times for “just cause.”225 Although instances of just cause are not
specifically enumerated, this provision grants more flexibility to the
timeframe that accompanies declaring the winner of a presidential
election and could foreseeably extend the stated deadlines in the
event presidential candidates are separated by only a few thousand
votes.
Section 44
Section 44 amends paragraph (8) of Code section 21-2-566 to
include “electronic ballot marker” in the list of items that, if willfully
tampered with, will constitute interference with primaries and
elections.226
Section 45
Section 45 amends paragraph (3) of Code section 21-2-579 and
adds electronic ballot markers to the list of voting equipment and

223.
224.
225.
226.
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provides that it will constitute fraud if an individual assists or enables
an unauthorized person to use such equipment.227
Section 46
Section 46 amends Code section 21-2-580 to include as a felonious
offense any instance where a person unlawfully tampers with or
damages an electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine, willfully
prepares an electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine in an
improper order for voting, or prevents or attempts to prevent the
correct operation of such electronic ballot marker, tabulating
machine, or voting machine.228
Section 47
Section 47 amends Code section 21-2-582 to include as a felonious
offense instances where a person tampers with or damages an
electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine to be used or being
used in connection with any primary or general election, in addition
to instances where a person prevents or attempts to prevent the
correction of an electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine.229
Section 48
Section 48 amends Code section 21-2-582.1 relating to penalty for
voting equipment modification to include electronic ballot markers in
the definition of “voting equipment.”230
Section 49
Section 49 amends Code section 21-2-587 to include instances of
poll-worker fraud where a poll worker tampers with electronic ballot
markers or tabulating machines.231 Additionally, this section includes
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 45, at 38.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 46, at 38.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 47, at 38.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 48, at 38–39.
2019 Ga. Laws 7, § 49, at 39.
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instances of poll-worker fraud where a poll worker fails to return to
election officials an electronic ballot marker or tabulating machine
memory card.232
Analysis
Representative Barry Fleming (R-121st) introduced HB 316 in an
effort
to
“uniformly
update
Georgia’s
voting
machines . . . incorporat[ing]
an
all
new
paper
ballot
233
component . . . [to] move us into the twenty-first century.”
As
dozens of legislators noted over the course of the bill’s passage,
however, the Act has left several potential consequences of the bill
unaddressed, including a purported unfunded mandate, weak and
widely misunderstood audit language, and vague language that would
authorize the Secretary of State to join and provide voters’ personal
information to nongovernmental organizations.234 Further, whether
the Act and the voting machines ultimately chosen by the Secretary
of State adequately secure Georgia voters’ constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection has yet to be determined by the federal
court where constitutional challenges to the use of DRE systems are
still pending.235
Funding for the Act
Opponents of the bill were quick to point out that HB 316, for
which $150 million had already been appropriated in Governor Brian
Kemp’s (R) proposed Fiscal Year 2020 budget, was unaccompanied
by a fiscal note and therefore, they believed, in violation of state law,

232. Id.
233. House Subcommittee Video, supra note 29, at 21 min., 19 sec. (remarks by Rep. Barry Fleming
(R-121st)).
234. See generally Video Recording of Senate Floor Debate (Mar. 13, 2019) (remarks by Sen. Zahra
Karinshak (D-48th), Sen. Elena Parent (D-42nd), Sen. David Lucas (D-26th), Sen. Steve Henson (D41st), Sen. Nan Orrock (D-36th), Sen. Harold Jones II (D-22nd), Sen. Jennifer Jordan (D-6th), and Sen.
Sally Harrell (D-40th)) https://livestream.com/accounts/26021522/events/7940809/videos/188633474
[hereinafter Senate Floor Debate]; House Proceedings Video, supra note 39 (remarks by Rep. Jasmine
Clark (D-108th) and Rep. James Beverly (D-143rd)).
235. See generally Curling v. Raffensperger, No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, 2019 WL 3822123 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 15, 2019).
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the Georgia Constitution, and the rules of the Georgia State Senate.236
During floor debates in the Senate, Senator Elena Parent (D-42nd)
and Minority Leader Steve Henson (D-41st) vehemently decried
passage of HB 316 without an accompanying fiscal note, with
Senator Henson cautioning that it sets a bad precedent for the State of
Georgia and noting “[i]t is not an accident. There is a reason why we
do not have a fiscal note.”237
Other legislators, including Senator Sally Harrell (D-40th) and
Senator Zahra Karinshak (D-48th), joined in challenging the costs
that HB 316 would impose on Georgia’s taxpayers and counties,
citing several conflicting sources that estimated $6 million per year in
maintenance costs and licensing fees.238 Senator Karinshak,
remarking that “local governments are probably in for a rude
awakening,” was particularly troubled that the cost of risk-limiting
audits was not included in the budget and, based on estimates from
other states, would be significant.239 Additionally, both Senator
Parent and Senator David Lucas (D-26th) reported having received
calls from concerned local election officials about not having the
necessary funding to maintain the new machines.240
Lieutenant Governor Geoff Duncan (R) overruled Senator
Henson’s objection that HB 316 was out of order, finding instead that
HB 316’s fiscal impact had already been sufficiently addressed by
the Fiscal Year 2020 budget that calls for $150 million in bond funds
to pay for the new voting machines.241 In response, Senator Henson
236. Senate Proceedings Video, supra note 47, at 1 hr., 53 min., 51 sec. (remarks by Sen. Steve
Henson (D-41st)). O.C.G.A. § 28-5-42 requires that “[a]ny bill having a significant impact on the
anticipated revenue or expenditure level of any . . . state agency must be introduced no later than the
twentieth day of any session,” and that the sponsor must request a fiscal note on such bills “by
November 1 of the year preceding the annual convening of the General Assembly in which the bill is to
be introduced . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 28-5-42 (2018); see also DeMillo Interview, supra note 213 (the lack of
a fiscal note “calls into question the legitimacy of the entire legislative process and raises constitutional
issues that undermine public confidence in elections”).
237. Senate Proceedings Video, supra note 47, at 1 hr., 53 min., 51 sec. (remarks by Sen. Steve
Henson (D-41st)).
238. Senate Floor Debate, supra note 234, at 2 hr., 42 min., 48 sec. (Mar. 13, 2019) (remarks by Sen.
Zahra Karinshak (D-48th)). Senator Karinshak noted that the original report that Election Systems &
Software submitted had informed the Secretary of State that the additional costs would come to
approximately $6 million annually and that legislators “have no idea who’s paying for this.” Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2 hr., 8 min., 1 sec. (remarks by Sen. Elena Parent (D-42nd) and Sen. David Lucas
(D-26th)).
241. HB 316, as introduced, 2019 Ga. Gen. Assemb.; Danny Kanso, Overview of Georgia’s 2020
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moved to challenge Lieutenant Governor Duncan’s ruling, and
pursuant to Code section 28-5-49(c)(2), the Senate voted along party
lines to waive the requirement of a local impact fiscal note.
Auditing Required by the Act
Another unresolved consequence of HB 316 involves audit
procedures and requirements under the new law. Originally touted as
one of the bill’s crucial features,242 several legislators and experts
have since criticized it for its weak language.243 After noting that
auditability is an “all-important” feature of HB 316 in his
presentation to the Senate Committee on Ethics, Representative
Fleming also stated that exact audit procedures will “have to be
fleshed out once [the State] know[s] what kind of systems [it is]
going to have.”244
In fact, HB 316 only requires a precertification tabulation audit to
be conducted, which, after an amendment by Senate Democrats was
proposed to and accepted by the Senate Ethics Committee, must take
place no later than November 2020.245 Risk-limiting audits, however,
are not required as a permanent feature; instead, the Secretary of
State must conduct a risk-limiting audit pilot program with a risk
limit of no more than 10% in a minimum of one county by December
31, 2021.246 Within ninety days, the Secretary of State must report to
the General Assembly with a plan on how risk-limited audits would
be implemented statewide.247
Fiscal Year Budget, GA. BUDGET & POL’Y INST. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://gbpi.org/2019/overview-ofgeorgia-2020-fiscal-year-budget/ [https://perma.cc/9SGJ-XAWB].
242. Video Recording of Senate Ethics Committee Meeting at 37 min., 32 sec. (Mar. 6, 2019)
(remarks
by
Rep.
Barry
Fleming
(R-121st)),
https://livestream.com/accounts/26021522/events/8751687/videos/194387379 [hereinafter Senate Ethics
Committee Video].
243. Senate Floor Debate, supra note 234 at 2 hr., 53 min., 50 sec. (remarks by Sen. Elena Parent
(D-42nd)); Senate Ethics Committee Video, supra note 242, 37 min., 32 sec. (remarks by Rep. Barry
Fleming (R-121st).
244. Senate Ethics Committee Video, supra note 242, 37 min., 32 sec. (remarks by Rep. Barry
Fleming (R-121st).
245. Id.
246. See generally Post-Election Audits, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS. (Aug. 5, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VMJ7-XEBE].
247. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-498(e) (2019).
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Senator Elena Parent sharply criticized her colleagues in the
Senate for not recognizing the difference between risk-limiting audits
and precertification tabulation audits, stating that:
[T]he audit language itself in this bill is extremely
weak. It doesn’t require any risk-limiting audit except
for the pilot program, which is only in one county. It
doesn’t require them after that. So with all this talk
about audits . . . the bill doesn’t even say we’re going
to require them.248
Garland Favorito, founder of VOTER GA and information
technology expert, confirmed this sentiment in his testimony to the
Senate Ethics Committee. Favorito explained:
Experts say that the audits of [BMDs] are
meaningless . . . . The bill works off of risk-limiting
audit procedures, but in the bill, if you read it very
carefully, the procedures are all conditional, not
mandatory . . . Essentially what it says is we might
have some audit procedures in 2024 or later, so that
puts emphasis on having a very, very secure machine.
We can’t rely on auditing.249
Favorito further cautioned that he believed HB 316 legalized
unverifiable voting because not only is the onus for catching machine
errors and alterations on the voter, but also “BMDs do not provide
voters a way to demonstrate to poll workers or elections officials that
a BMD has malfunctioned.”250
Beth K. Boatright & Andrew Smith
248. Senate Floor Debate, supra note 234, at 2 hr., 53 min., 50 sec. (remarks by Sen. Elena Parent (D42nd)).
249. Senate Ethics Committee Video, supra note 242, at 37 min., 32 sec. (remarks by Garland
Favorito, VOTER GA).
250. Id. Favorito noted that this conclusion is supported by twenty-four computer scientists who
wrote to the SAFE Commission in 2018 to caution against the use of BMDs because voters become
entirely responsible for catching any discrepancies between the voter’s intent and the printed summary
of their ballot. Id.
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